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THE RETURN OF “VOODOO INFORMATION”: A 
CALL TO RESIST A HEIGHTENED 
AUTHENTICATION STANDARD FOR EVIDENCE 
DERIVED FROM SOCIAL NETWORKING 
WEBSITES 
Richard W. Fox+ 
Plaintiff’s electronic ‘evidence’ is totally insufficient. . . . [T]he 
Court continues to warily and wearily view [the Internet] largely as 
one large catalyst for rumor, innuendo, and misinformation. . . . 
[A]ny evidence procured off the Internet is adequate for almost 
nothing. . . . Instead of relying on the voodoo information taken from 
the Internet, Plaintiff must hunt for hard copy back-up 
documentation in admissible form. . . .1   
This quote, from Federal District Court Judge Samuel Kent in 1999, roughly 
coincides with the dawn of the Internet era.2  Eight years later, this same judge 
presided over a case in which he used a “quick search on the [I]nternet” to hold 
that it would not be prohibitively expensive for plaintiffs to fly from Ecuador 
to San Diego to attend court.3  Is this judge being hypocritical, or does he 
simply no longer believe that the Internet is “voodoo information” that is 
“adequate for almost nothing”?4 
Judge Kent’s attitude is not unique among American jurists who are 
skeptical of evidence derived from new forms of technology.5  Judges have 
expressed this attitude in opinions concerning the admissibility of audio 
                     
 +J.D. Candidate, May 2013, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; 
B.A., 2006, Boston University.  The author wishes to thank Hans Moore for his perspective from 
the trenches, as well as the staff and editors of the Catholic University Law Review, whose 
comments and edits were indispensable.  The author also wishes to thank his family, particularly 
his mother, Carol, whose love and support made him the man he is.  Finally, thank you, Sarah, for 
making me a better man every day. 
 1. St. Clair v. Johnny’s Oyster & Shrimp, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 2d 773, 774–75 (S.D. Tex. 
1999). 
 2. See Andrew C. Payne, Note, Twitigation: Old Rules in A New World, 49 WASHBURN 
L.J. 841, 844 (2010) (“In the late 1990s and early 2000s, companies jumped on the Internet 
bandwagon and put their full faith in e-commerce.”). 
 3. Tobar v. United States, No. G-07-003, 2007 WL 1296717, at *1 n.1, 2  (S.D. Tex. Apr. 
30, 2007). 
 4. St. Clair, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 775; see also Steven Goode, The Admissibility of Electronic 
Evidence, 29 REV. LITIG. 1, 66 n.14 (2009) (noting the inconsistency in Judge Kent’s opinions on 
the evidentiary value of the information procured from the Internet). 
 5. Goode, supra note 4, at 4 (“Our jurisprudence is littered with examples of courts 
confronting the admissibility of evidence based on new technologies, and courts have reacted in a 
predictable pattern.  At first, new technologies meet with judicial resistance.”). 
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recordings,6 photographs,7 motion pictures,8 and computer generated business 
records.9  As the prevalence and judicial acceptance of these technologies have 
grown, courts have lowered the barriers to admissibility.10 
As exemplified by Judge Kent, judicial treatment of electronic evidence11 
appears to mirror the same pattern as other forms of new technological 
evidence: initial recalcitrance followed by begrudging acceptance.12  However, 
what has not yet become apparent is whether evidence derived from social 
networking websites13 will also follow this trend.14  The manner in which 
courts will handle this issue is significant for a number of reasons.  First, 
society’s practice of posting personal information on social networking sites15 
has led a growing number of litigators to search these sites for evidence.16  
However, the time and effort spent searching these sites is useless if uncovered 
                     
 6. See Goode, supra note 4, at 4 (quoting State v. Simon, 174 A. 867, 872 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 
1934), aff’d, 178 A. 728 (N.J. 1935)) (“We know of no case, and counsel cite none, in which a 
phonograph record of an alleged conversation was admitted in a court of law as evidence 
thereof.”)). 
 7. See id. (quoting Cunningham v. Fair Haven & W. R. Co., 43 A. 1047, 1049 (Conn. 
1899)) (excluding photographic evidence and noting that “either through want of skill on the part 
of the artist, or inadequate instruments or materials, or through intentional and skillful 
manipulation, a photograph may be not only inaccurate, but dangerously misleading”). 
 8. See id. at 4 n.8 (quoting JORDAN S. GRUBER, ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE § 8:1 (1995)) 
(explaining that “[m]otion pictures were at first often objected to, and sometimes excluded, 
because they were said to provide ample opportunity for fabrication, falsification, or distortion.”). 
 9. United States v. Scholle, 553 F.2d 1109, 1125 (8th Cir. 1977) (upholding the trial 
court’s admission of computer generated business records, but noting that “the complex nature of 
computer storage” requires controls that assure accuracy and reliability). 
 10. See Goode, supra note 4, at 4. 
 11. For the purposes of this Comment, “electronic evidence” is defined as “information 
stored or transmitted in digital form that a party to a legal action may use to further his or her 
case.”  John S. Wilson, MySpace, Your Space, or Our Space? New Frontiers in Electronic 
Evidence, 86 OR. L. REV. 1201, 1204 (2007). 
 12. Goode, supra note 4, at 4–6. 
 13. The phrase “evidence derived from social networking websites,” will hereinafter be 
referred to as “social networking evidence.” 
 14. See Katherine Minotti, The Advent of Digital Diaries: Implications of Social Networking 
Web Sites for the Legal Profession, 60 S.C. L. REV. 1057, 1070 (2009) (observing that there is no 
consensus on whether information from social networking websites should be admitted as 
evidence). 
 15. For example, as of June 2012, Facebook had 955 million active users and 522 million 
daily active users.  Key Facts, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM, http://newsroom.fb.com/content/default 
.aspx?NewsAreaId=22 (last visited Sept. 27, 2012). 
 16. See Minotti, supra note 14, at 1059 (citing Vesna Jaksic, Litigation Clues Are Found on 
Facebook: Lawyers Use Social Networks as a Tool, 30 NAT’L L.J. 1, 1 (2007)) (noting that 
prosecutors have used social networking sites to “prove a defendant’s subsequent questionable 
conduct or lack of remorse”). 
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information is inadmissible at trial.17  Second, the admissibility of such 
information will have significant bearing on how fact finders will determine 
the outcomes of future cases.18  Despite the importance of these issues, legal 
practitioners continue to neglect a critical step19 when seeking to admit 
electronically generated documents into evidence: the authentication 
requirement.20 
The starting point for any discussion involving authentication of evidence is 
Rule 901 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.21 Courts have applied Rule 90122 to 
cases involving the authentication of e-mails,23 instant messages,24 and website 
postings.25  One notable exception to this development is the lack of consensus 
that has emerged regarding the rule’s applicability to social networking 
evidence.26  This uncertainty, in part, is due to the scarcity of cases that discuss 
social networking evidence.27  Ambiguity in this area also stems from 
                     
 17. See Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 538 (D. Md. 2007) (noting that it 
“makes little sense” to spend the time and money to procure electronic evidence that may 
ultimately be deemed inadmissible). 
 18. See Minotti, supra note 14, at 1066–68. 
 19. This “step” has been referred to as “a series of hurdles to be cleared by the proponent of 
the evidence.”  Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 538.  One legal commentator has gone so far as to note 
that in certain circumstances, litigators must “jump through . . . hoops” to have evidence 
admitted.  Goode, supra note 4, at 7–8. 
 20. Hon. Paul Grimm et. al., Back to the Future: Lorraine v. Markel American Insurance 
Co. and New Findings on the Admissibility of Electronically Stored Information, 42 AKRON L. 
REV. 357, 366 (2009) (noting that courts struggle with basic authentication principles for 
electronic data).  This phenomenon may be attributable to the fact that “the most challenging 
aspect of admitting digital evidence is to establish its authenticity.”  Id. at 365.  However, as this 
Comment explains, an even more troubling scenario arises when a litigant properly authenticates 
electronic evidence, and the court misconstrues the authentication standard.  See infra Part II.A. 
 21. See infra Part I.A.  Although none of the ten illustrations contained in Rule 901(b) 
specifically mention electronic evidence, the advisory committee’s note indicates that the drafters 
intended for Rule 901 to apply to electronic evidence.  FED. R. EVID. 901 advisory committee’s 
note. 
 22. Although Rule 901 is a federal rule, most states have adopted similar provisions.  See 3 
BARBARA E. BERGMAN & NANCY HOLLANDER, WHARTON’S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 14:2 (15th 
ed. Supp. 2011) (“Most of the states have adopted evidentiary provisions essentially identical to 
Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(1).”).  Unless specifically addressing a unique provision of a state rule, 
discussion of the Federal Rules of Evidence in this Comment applies to state rules as well. 
 23. See United States v. Siddiqui, 235 F.3d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 2000); see also infra Part 
I.B.1. 
 24. See United States v. Gagliardi, 506 F.3d 140, 151 (2d Cir. 2007); see also infra Part 
I.B.2. 
 25. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1154 (C.D. Cal. 
2002); see also infra Part I.B.3. 
 26. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 27. Minotti, supra note 14, at 1070 (“Like federal case law, there is limited state case law on 
social networking web sites . . . .”). 
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conflicting opinions28 and factual differences29 in the few cases that have 
addressed the issue.30 
Of the relatively few court decisions discussing social networking evidence, 
the opinion of the Maryland Court of Appeals in Griffin v. State deserves a 
more thorough examination.31  The  Griffin court addressed whether the 
government properly authenticated a MySpace profile page of the defendant’s 
girlfriend.32  Over the defense counsel’s objection that the State failed to 
authenticate the MySpace page, the trial judge admitted a redacted version of 
the profile into evidence.33  After the jury convicted the defendant on all 
counts, the defendant appealed on the grounds that the trial court erred in 
admitting the MySpace page.34  The case eventually reached the highest court 
in Maryland, the Maryland Court of Appeals, which reversed the lower court 
decision based on a finding that the trial judge committed reversible error by 
admitting the MySpace page into evidence.35 
This Comment will explore the question of how courts should confront the 
issue of authenticating social networking evidence.  Part I begins with a 
comprehensive overview of how courts have addressed authenticating other 
forms of electronic evidence, including e-mail, instant messages, and website 
content.  Part I continues by examining the court decisions that have addressed 
the issue of authenticating social networking evidence, particularly the 
majority and dissenting opinions of Griffin.  Next, in Part II, this Comment 
analyzes how most case law, with the exception of Griffin, has correctly 
applied the existing legal framework for authentication to address the issues 
raised by electronic evidence.  Part II also discusses the troubling nature of 
Griffin’s overly burdensome authentication standard for social networking 
evidence.36  In Part III, this Comment concludes by arguing that Griffin’s 
                     
 28. Compare State v. Bell, No. CA2008-05-044, 2009 WL 1395857, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. 
May 18, 2009) (finding no error in the trial court’s ruling that MySpace printouts were properly 
authenticated), with Griffin v. State, 19 A.3d 415, 423–24 (Md. 2011) (finding that the trial court 
erred by admitting MySpace pages as properly authenticated).  See also Minotti, supra note 14, at 
1061 (noting that there is no consensus among courts on the admissibility of websites). 
 29. See Minotti, supra note 14, at 1061 (noting that cases discussing the application of the 
authentication rule to social networking websites are often decided through fact-specific 
analysis). 
 30. Minotti, supra note 14, at 1063 (observing that “case law discussing the applicability of 
the Federal Rules to social networking web sites specifically is scarce”). 
 31. Griffin, 19 A.3d at 415. 
 32. Id. at 417. 
 33. Griffin v. State, 995 A.2d 791, 796–97 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010), rev’d, 19 A.3d 415.  
Defense counsel objected on the grounds that the prosecutor did not establish a sufficient 
connection between the profile page and Barber, and that Barber was not questioned about the 
page.  Id. at 796. 
 34. Id. at 794. 
 35. Id. at 418. 
 36. See id. at 427–48 (listing ways in which authentication can be obtained). 
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heightened standard should be abandoned and replaced with the “reasonable 
juror” standard advocated by the Griffin dissent.37 
I.  APPLICABILITY OF RULE 901 TO ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE 
A.  The “Reasonable Juror” Standard 
A litigant seeking to introduce an item into evidence must first authenticate 
it.38  Rule 901 sets the basic standard for authentication: “To satisfy the 
requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the proponent 
must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the 
proponent claims it is.”39  Courts have often observed that the authentication 
requirement imposes “a relatively low bar.”40  In fact, counsel does not 
necessarily have to convince the court that the evidence is what it is purported 
to be.41  Rather, the test for authentication is whether a reasonable juror would 
find in favor of authenticity.42  All forms of evidence that a proponent seeks to 
admit into evidence must be authenticated.43  Consequently, the reasonable 
juror standard has been applied to resolve authentication issues involving 
different types of evidence,44 including physical evidence,45 audio recordings,46  
 
                     
 37. See id. at 428 (Harrell, J., dissenting) (arguing that the standard should be to require 
“evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent 
claims”). 
 38. FED. R. EVID. 901(a). 
 39. Id.  In other words, “is the evidence what it purports to be?”  Hon. Randy Wilson, 
Admissibility of Web Based Data, 52 THE ADVOC. (TEXAS) 31, 31 (2010). 
 40. Grimm, supra note 20, at 367; accord United States v. Gagliardi, 506 F.3d 140, 151 (2d 
Cir. 2007) (stating the authentication standard is “minimal”); United States v. Safavian, 435 F. 
Supp. 2d 36, 38 (D.D.C. 2006) (“The threshold for the Court’s determination of authenticity is 
not high.”). 
 41. See Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 38. 
 42. Ricketts v. City of Hartford, 74 F.3d 1397, 1411 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. 
Ruggiero, 928 F.2d 1280, 1303 (2d Cir. 1991)); Blake Tartt & Jeffrey S. Wolff, Article IX: 
Authentication and Identification, 30 HOUS. L. REV. 1029, 1035 (1993) (“The proponent, 
therefore, need not convince the court that the matter is genuine; he must only produce sufficient 
evidence so that a reasonable jury could properly find that it is.”). 
 43. FED. R. EVID. 901(a). 
 44. 7 BARBARA E. BERGMAN & NANCY HOLLANDER, WHARTON’S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE  
§ 101:8, n.2 (15th ed. 2002). 
 45. See, e.g., Coleman v. State, 833 S.W.2d 286, 289 (Tex. App. 1992) (finding that a vial 
of blood was properly authenticated because a reasonable jury could find that the evidence had 
been properly authenticated or identified). 
 46. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 150 P.3d 111, 118 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007) (finding that a 
911 recording was properly authenticated when the proponent “introduce[d] sufficient proof to 
permit a reasonable juror to find in favor of authenticity or identification”). 
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surveillance video,47 and photographs.48 
The underlying legal justification for the reasonable juror standard is 
illustrated in Lorraine v. Markel American Insurance Co., where the court 
describes the relationship between Rule 104(b) and Rule 901.49  Rule 104(b), 
which governs “matters of conditional relevance generally,” provides that the 
relevancy of evidence depends on whether the proponent has introduced facts 
“sufficient to support a finding” that a factual condition has been fulfilled.50  
The Lorraine court observed that, according to Rule 901’s advisory 
committee’s note, Rule 104(b) governs Rule 901’s application because 
authentication is a type of relevancy that depends on the proponent fulfilling a 
condition of fact.51  Therefore, because authentication is a “subset” of 
conditional relevance, authentication depends on whether the proponent 
introduces facts that a jury will determine are “sufficient to support a finding” 
that the evidence is authentic.52 
Although Rule 901 lays out the general standard for authenticating evidence, 
“the rule is silent as to how, exactly, courts and lawyers should demonstrate 
that evidence is what its proponent claims.”53  Rule 901(b) provides a  
non-exhaustive list of ten examples that demonstrate how to authenticate 
evidence.54  Judges and attorneys have most often turned to Rules 901(b)(1) 
(testimony of a knowledgeable witness) and 901(b)(4) (distinctive 
                     
 47. See, e.g., Sanford v. State, No. 12-08-00012-CR, 2009 WL 3161505, at *2 (Tex. App. 
Sept. 30, 2009) (holding that a surveillance video was properly authenticated and observing that 
“the ultimate test for authentication is always whether the proponent of the evidence has made a 
showing sufficient to permit a reasonable juror to find that the evidence is what its proponent 
claims”). 
 48. Christine A. Guilshan, A Picture Is Worth a Thousand Lies: Electronic Imaging and the 
Future of the Admissibility of Photographs into Evidence, 18 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 
365, 368 (1992) (observing that “[a]uthenticating photographs and thereby satisfying the second 
prong of the admissibility test is also not difficult”). 
 49. 241 F.R.D. 534, 539 (D. Md. 2007).  The author of the Lorraine opinion, Chief 
Magistrate Judge Paul William Grimm, is “a recognized authority on evidentiary issues 
concerning electronic evidence.”  Griffin v. State, 19 A.3d 415, 422 (Md. 2011).  Judge Grimm 
also authored a law review article on the Lorraine opinion, which explains that Lorraine was 
intended to be “a ‘how to’ for the authentication of electronic evidence.”  Grimm, supra note 20, 
at 366. 
 50. FED. R. EVID. 104(b). 
 51. Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 539–40 (citing United States v. Branch, 970 F.2d 1368 (4th Cir. 
1992)) (classifying authentication as a type of relevance by noting that it would be impossible for 
an item of evidence to have any bearing on a consequential fact in a case if the evidence is not 
what its proponent claims); see also FED. R. EVID. 901 advisory committee’s note. 
 52. Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 539–40 (“[B]ecause authentication is essentially a question of 
conditional relevancy, the jury ultimately resolves whether the evidence admitted for its 
consideration is that which the proponent claims.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 53. Grimm, supra note 20, at 367. 
 54. See FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(1)–(10). 
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characteristics) to authenticate electronic evidence,55 while authentication 
through Rule 901(b)(3) (comparison by trier or expert witness) has occurred 
less frequently.56  The discussion that follows examines how courts have 
applied these 901(b) illustrations57 to authenticate e-mail, instant messages, 
and website content.58 
B.  Application of Rule 901 to Electronic Evidence 
1.  E-Mail 
To authenticate e-mail evidence, courts have applied the Rule 901(b) 
illustrations, as well as the reasonable juror standard.59 In order to understand 
how and why courts have done this, one must comprehend the legally relevant 
aspects of e-mail communication itself.60  As opposed to traditional mail, e-
mail provides individuals the ability to transmit information instantly to an 
intended recipient’s electronic mailbox.61  This capability allows for people to 
transmit or reveal, often impulsively, information about themselves or others 
that may later become crucial evidence in court.62  In fact, the court in 
Lorraine opined that e-mail is unquestionably the most prevalent form of 
                     
 55. Goode, supra note 4, at 9. 
 56. United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 40 (D.D.C. 2006). 
 57. Rule 901 sets a low standard for proof that permeates each of these illustrations.  See 
FED. R. EVID. 901 advisory committee’s note (“The characteristics of the item itself, considered 
in the light of circumstances, afford authentication techniques in great variety.”); Lorraine, 241 
F.R.D. at 546 (“Although the common law origin of Rule 901(b)(3) involved its use for 
authenticating handwriting or signatures, it is now commonly used to authenticate  
documents. . . .”);  5 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL 
EVIDENCE § 901.03[2] (2d ed. 2012). (“[I]n recognition of the proponent’s light burden of proof 
in [authenticating an exhibit] . . . the ‘knowledge’ requirement of Rule 901(b)(1) is liberally 
construed.”). 
 58. Courts have applied other authentication measures in addition to 901(b)(1) and (4) to 
authenticate electronic evidence, such as online government publications.  See Hon. Randy 
Wilson, Admissibility of Web-Based Data, 52 ADVOC. 31, 31–32 (2010), available at 
http://www.litigationsection.com/downloads/Advocate_V52_Fall2010Web.pdf.  A discussion of 
these authentication measures is beyond the scope of this Comment. 
 59. United States v. Tank, 200 F.3d 627, 630 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 60. United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 40 (D.D.C. 2006) (discussing “distinctive 
characteristics” of e-mail as part of its Rule 901 analysis). 
 61. Compare Mail Definition, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE, 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/112481?rskey=1PMBjw&result=2&isAdvanced=false#eid (last 
visited Oct. 17, 2012) (defining mail as “the letters, packages, etc. delivered to or intended for one 
address or individual”), with E-mail Definition, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE, 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/60701?rskey=JDbs3W&result=2&isAdvanced=false#eid (last 
visited Oct. 17, 2012) (defining electronic mail as “[a] system for sending textual messages . . . to 
one or more recipients via a computer network”). 
 62. Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 554 (“Perhaps because of the spontaneity and informality of  
e-mail, . . . e-mail evidence often figures prominently in cases where state of mind, motive, and 
intent must be proved.”). 
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electronic evidence,63 noting that “it is not unusual to see a case consisting 
entirely of e-mail evidence.”64 
As previously noted, a proponent seeking to admit e-mail into evidence must 
first authenticate it.65  The largest obstacle to authentication is confirming that 
a particular individual authored a specific e-mail.66  Litigants have overcome 
this challenge by creatively employing the 901(b) illustrations to introduce 
evidence sufficient to satisfy a reasonable juror that an e-mail is what the 
proponent claims.67 
Shea v. State, a criminal case from Texas, provides a straightforward 
illustration of how a litigant can use Rule 901(b)(1) and Rule 901(b)(4) to 
authenticate an e-mail.68  In this case, a jury convicted Kevin Shea of 
indecency with a child.69  Shea appealed his conviction on the grounds that the 
State had not authenticated a series of e-mails Shea had sent to his underage 
victim,70  and therefore, the trial court erred in admitting them into evidence.71  
Citing Rule 901(b)(1) of the Texas Rules of Evidence, the appellate court held 
that the trial court did not err in admitting the e-mails because “[t]he 
                     
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. FED. R. EVID. 901(a). 
 66. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 57, at § 900.07[3][c] (stating that reliance on the 
sending address is misplaced because “e-mail messages can be sent by persons other than the 
sender”); Goode, supra note 4, at 10 (arguing that the biggest challenge to authenticating e-mails 
is determining the e-mail’s author). 
 67. See, e.g., Shea v. State, 167 S.W.3d 98 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005) (employing 901(b)(1) and 
901(b)(4) to authenticate an e-mail).  There is a subtle distinction between evidence that proves a 
computer printout is an accurate representation of the electronic data, and evidence that 
establishes a connection between the electronic evidence and a particular person.  See United 
States v. Tank, 200 F.3d 627, 630 (2d. Cir 2000) (distinguishing between evidence showing that 
printouts were “an accurate representation of the chat room conversations” and evidence that 
“established a connection between [the defendant] and the chat room log printouts”).  Unlike 
establishing a connection between the person and the chat room log, the accuracy of a printout 
only affects “the weight of the printouts, not their admissibility.”  Id. (quoting United States v. 
Catabran, 836 F.2d 453, 458 (9th Cir. 1988)). 
 68. Shea, 167 S.W.3d at 104–05. 
 69. Id. at 100. 
 70. Id. at 104.  Electronic communications, like all communications, challenge the 
proponent to establish that a particular person was the communication’s author.  See Andrew M. 
Grossman, No, Don’t IM Me—Instant Messaging, Authentication, and the Best Evidence Rule, 13 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 1309, 1310 (2006) (observing that “connecting the identity of an online 
friend to that of a prosecutable human being can be difficult”); see also Griffin v. State, 19 A.3d 
415, 419–20 (Md. 2011) (noting that the authorship of the MySpce account was at issue); In re 
F.P., 878 A.2d 91, 95–96 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (“A signature can be forged; a letter can be typed 
on another’s typewriter; distinct letterhead stationary [sic] can be copied or stolen” (citation 
omitted)); Shea, 167 S.W.3d at 104  (“[T]he issue of authentication arises whenever the relevancy 
of any evidence depends upon its identity, source, or connection with a particular person, place, 
thing or event.” (quoting Kephart v. State, 875 S.W. 2d 319, 321 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994)) 
(emphasis added)). 
 71. Shea, 167 S.W.3d at 104. 
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complainant testified that she was familiar with Shea’s e-mail address and that 
she had received the six e-mails in question from Shea.”72  Accordingly, the 
court held that the victim’s testimony sufficiently authenticated the e-mails.73 
The court also addressed how the “distinctive characteristics” of e-mail can 
be used for authentication purposes under Rule 901(b)(4), and found that 
several distinctive characteristics of the e-mails in question supported their 
authenticity.74  Specifically, the victim testified that Shea had called her to 
confirm that she had received his e-mails, and that two of the e-mails 
referenced Shea’s employment as a furniture maker.75  Thus, the court in this 
case held that the evidence was properly admitted under both Rule 901(b)(1) 
and Rule 901(b)(4).76 
2.  Instant Messages77 
Although e-mail messages are delivered to users’ electronic inboxes,78 
instant messages are sent and received between users in real-time, on-line 
conversations.79  For example, user A will send a message under her online 
pseudonym80 to user B, which user B instantly receives.  Using her own online 
                     
 72. Id. at 105. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id.  Under the Federal Rules of Evidence as well as the Texas Rules of Evidence, Rule 
901(b)(4) provides that authentication can be shown by “distinctive characteristics and the like.”  
FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(4); TEX. R. EVID. 901(b)(4).  This means, “[a]ppearance, contents, 
substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics, taken in conjunction with 
circumstances.”  TEX. R. EVID. 901(b)(4). 
 75. Shea, 167 S.W.3d at 105.  Other distinctive characteristics in a particular email included 
a statement that Shea liked the victim’s locker number (22) because it was the number of years in 
age difference that separated Shea and the victim.  Id.  The victim also testified that her telephone 
conversations with Shea were similar to the content of the e-mail.  Id.  Finally, the court observed 
that four of the e-mails were signed “Kev.” Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Instant messages are “generally the class of services that allows users of computers, 
data-enabled cellular phones, and other electronic devices to send one another text messages (and 
sometimes audio and video messages) instantaneously.”  Grossman, supra note 70, at 1311 
(noting that instant messaging, initially popular among teens, is used now by adults, large 
business, and government agencies, indicating that “adeptness at instant messaging is now the 
new threshold for computer literacy”). 
 78. Inbox Definition, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE, 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/248369?redirectedFrom=inbox#eid (last visited Oct. 17, 2012) 
(defining “inbox” as “the (notional) part of an electronic mailbox in which incoming messages 
are stored”). 
 79. In re F.P., 878 A.2d 91, 96 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (“Instant messaging differs from e-mail 
in that conversations happen in realtime. . . . Generally, both parties in the conversation see each 
line of text right after it is typed (line-by-line), thus making it more like a telephone conversation 
than exchanging letters.”). 
 80. Various courts and commentators have used different synonyms to describe an instant 
messenger’s online pseudonym.  See In re F.P., 878 A.2d at 94 (referring to the online 
pseudonyms used in instant message conversations as “screen names”); Grossman, supra note 70, 
at 1314 (referring to these pseudonyms as “handles”).  Grossman also notes that two people 
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pseudonym, user B responds to user A’s message, creating a dialogue.  As with 
e-mail, these digital conversations may later turn into critical evidence that 
determines the outcome of a case.81  Additionally, like e-mail, the major 
authentication hurdle is establishing the requisite connection between a 
message and the alleged user.82  In re F.P., a Pennsylvania court decision, 
demonstrates how courts have overcome Rule 901’s traditionally minimal 
authentication standard and have, in the process, eschewed a heightened 
authentication standard.83 
In In re F.P., a trial court found a defendant minor, F.P., delinquent on a 
single count of aggravated assault.84  The assault resulted from F.P.’s belief 
that the victim had stolen a DVD from him.85  The trial judge admitted into 
evidence printouts of two separate instant message conversations between F.P. 
and the victim that occurred before the assault.86  These conversations revealed 
that F.P. threatened the victim with violence for stealing the DVD.87  F.P. 
appealed his delinquency adjudication on the grounds that the trial judge erred 
in admitting the printouts into evidence.88  Specifically, F.P. argued that the 
government had not properly authenticated the pages because it failed to 
establish that F.P. authored the messages.89 
On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court upheld the trial court’s decision, 
using Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 901 as the basis for its holding.90  The 
                                                
cannot have the same handle at once.  Id.  This observation is particularly relevant for 
establishing authorship of an instant message because it limits the number of people who may 
author instant messages under a given name.  Id.  Although a person other than the handle’s 
creator may still access the account by stealing the account owner’s password, it is impossible to 
create a separate account using the same handle.  Id. 
 81. See Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 554 (2007) (discussing how an  
e-mail’s spontaneous and informal qualities make it valuable in cases “where state of mind, 
motive and intent must be proved”). 
 82. See supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text. 
 83. In re F.P., 878 A.2d at 93 (using circumstantial evidence to authenticate the instant 
message printouts and disagreeing with the defendant’s contention that instant message printouts 
could only be authenticated by producing the source’s background information from the Internet 
service provider or by having a computer forensics expert testify); Grossman, supra note 70, at 
1309. 
 84. In re F.P., 878 A.2d at 92–93.  F.P. approached the victim, Z.G., from behind and struck 
him in the head and face numerous times, causing the victim to be hospitalized for his injuries.  
Id. at 93. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 93–94. 
 87. Id. at 93. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. (arguing that the source needed to be identified or that a computer forensics expert 
should have testified). 
 90. In re F.P., 878 A.2d at 93–96.  The provisions of Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 901 
are substantively similar to Rule 901 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.  Commonwealth v. 
Brooks, 508 A.2d 316, 319 (1986) (finding it “noteworthy” that Pennsylvania’s approach to 
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court began its analysis by noting that Rule 901(a) establishes “‘[t]he 
requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to 
admissibility.’”91  With regard to how a proponent may authenticate evidence, 
the court noted that Rule 901(b)(1),92 as well as “direct and/or circumstantial 
evidence,”93 were appropriate authentication measures.94  It is notable that the 
court in In re F.P. methodically established Rule 901 as the appropriate 
analytical framework before discussing the law’s application to the facts.95 
The court noted that the victim testified that he used the screen name 
“WHITEBOY Z” and F.P. used the screen name “Icp4Life30” in the contested 
instant message conversation.96  The victim also testified that F.P. sent him text 
messages that expressed F.P.’s desire to fight the victim because of the stolen 
DVD.97  Comparing these text messages to the instant message conversation, 
the court observed that the conversation in question took place between 
individuals using those screen names, and that F.P. (Icp4Life30) repeatedly 
threatened the victim (WHITEBOY Z) with physical violence because of a 
stolen DVD.98  The court also based its conclusion on evidence that F.P. 
referred to himself by his first name during the instant message conversation.99 
                                                
authentication mirrors the circumstantial evidence analysis in the Federal Rules of Evidence); see 
also infra notes 91–93 and accompanying text. 
 91. In re F.P., 878 A.2d at 93–96 (quoting PA. R. EVID. 901(a)).   Compare PA. R. EVID. 
901(a) (establishing “the requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent 
to authenticity”), with FED. R. EVID. 901(a) (establishing “the requirement of authenticating or 
identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a 
finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is”). 
 92. Compare PA. R. EVID. 901(b)(1) (“Testimony of witness with knowledge . . . that a 
matter is what it is claimed to be.”), with FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(1) (“Testimony of a Witness with 
Knowledge . . . that an item is what it is claimed to be.”). 
 93. Somewhat curiously, the court does not cite Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 901(b)(4) to 
support its use of circumstantial evidence, even though the language mirrors Fed. R. Evid. 
901(b)(4).  Compare PA. R. EVID. 901(b)(4) (“Distinctive characteristics and the like [include] 
[a]ppearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics, taken in 
conjunction with the circumstances.”), with FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(4) (“Distinctive Characteristics 
and the Like [include] [a]ppearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive 
characteristics of the item, taken in conjunction with the circumstances.”).  Rather, the In re F.P. 
court supports its proposition that “[a] document may be authenticated by direct proof and/or by 
circumstantial evidence” by citing case law.  In re F.P., 878 A.2d at 94 (citing Commonwealth v. 
Brooks, 508 A.2d 316, 318 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986)).  Despite this, the language and context of the 
In re F.P. decision support the conclusion that the court regards Rule 901(b)(4) as a proper 
authentication method.  Id. 
 94. In re F.P., 878 A.2d at 93–94. 
 95. Id. at 93–95. 
 96. Id. at 94. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. (noting that the conversations occurred over a period of at least two days). 
 99. Id.  The victim also testified that he notified school officials of F.P.’s threats after the 
first instant message conversation.  Id. at 95.  During the school’s attempt to mediate the matter, 
the second threatening instant message conversation took place, in which F.P chastised the victim 
for bringing the matter to the attention of school officials.  Id. 
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In applying the Rule 901 illustrations to the case facts, the court did not 
specifically categorize certain facts as authenticating the transcripts through 
Rule 901(b)(1), and other facts as authenticating the transcripts through direct 
or circumstantial evidence.100  Rather, the court discussed its Rule 901(b)(1) 
analysis concurrently with its “circumstantial evidence” analysis to 
demonstrate how the victim’s testimony reinforced the conclusion that F.P. 
authored the threatening messages.101  Although the court viewed the victim’s 
testimony as circumstantial evidence that supported the authenticity of the 
instant message printouts,102 the court also explicitly referenced Rule 
901(b)(1).103 
3.  Website Content104 
As opposed to the two-way communication of e-mail and instant messaging, 
website content “flow[s] from the website owner to the viewer—a one-way 
street.”105  Despite these technological differences, the authentication issues 
that arise with e-mail and instant messaging also appear in cases involving the 
authentication of website content.106  Specifically, authentication issues center 
around whether the website is automatically “attributable to the owner of the 
                     
 100. Id. at 95.  The Shea court employed a similar approach.  See supra Part I.B.1. 
 101. In re F.P., 878 A.2d at 93–95. 
 102. Id. at 95–96  (“[T]he foundation may consist of circumstantial evidence and may 
include factors relating to the contents of the writing and the events before and after the execution 
of the writing.” (quoting Commonwealth v. Brooks, 508 A.2d 316, 321 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986))).  
But see People v. Von Gunten, No. C035261, 2002 WL 501612, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 2, 
2002) (holding that, despite the existence of circumstantial evidence supporting authenticity, a 
proponent had not adequately authenticated a transcript of an instant message conversation 
because “[t]here is no direct proof connecting [the person] with the screen name of BukaRoo20 in 
this case”).  Requiring direct proof appears to conflict with Rule 901(b)(4) and its low standard.  
See supra Part I.A. 
 103. In re F.P., 878 A.2d at 93–94 (citing PA. R. EVID. 901(b)(1)). 
 104. Website content refers to what Internet experts have defined as “Web 1.0.”  Web 1.0 is a 
term describing the first iteration of the web where users were predominantly fed content but had 
few ways to interact with other users.  Brian Getting, Basic Definitions: Web 1.0, Web 2.0, Web 
3.0, PRACTICAL ECOMMERCE (Apr. 18, 2007), http://www.practicalecommerce.com/articles/464-
Basic-Definitions-Web-1-0-Web-2-0-Web-3-0 (describing Web 1.0 as “read only” web); Tim 
O’Reilly, What is Web 2.0: Designed Patterns and Business Models for the Next Generation of 
Software, O’REILLY (Sept. 30, 2005), http://oreilly.com/web2/archive/what-is-web-20.html 
(coining the terms Web 1.0 and Web 2.0 to describe the changes made to the web in the early part 
of this decade). 
 105. Payne, supra note 2, at 843.  Payne notes that Web 1.0 has evolved from this basic form 
into Web 2.0, which is more interactive and embodies “dynamic information sharing.”  Id.; see 
infra Part I.C.1. 
 106. See Jarritos, Inc. v. Los Jarritos, No. C 05-02380 JSW, 2007 WL 1302506, at *10 (N.D. 
Cal. May 2, 2007), rev’d and remanded sub. nom. on other grounds Jarritos, Inc. v. Reyes, 345 F. 
App’x. 215 (9th Cir. 2009) (addressing the authentication of a picture printed from a website). 
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site.”107  This is a fair question given the possibility that a hacker might access 
a website and post unauthorized information.108  A similar concern implicates 
whether the proffered content ever actually existed on the alleged website.109  
As the following case illustrates, courts have addressed these issues by 
applying Rule 901.110 
Although the most common method of authenticating website content is 
Rule 901(b)(1) (testimony of a knowledgeable witness),111 one important 
question arises: “what kind of personal knowledge is required?”112  Must the 
website owner testify as to the exhibit’s authenticity, or will the testimony of a 
person other than the website owner suffice to authenticate?113  The court in 
Jarritos, Inc. v. Los Jarritos held that the latter was sufficient.114 
In Jarritos, the plaintiff sought to authenticate a picture of the defendant’s 
restaurant sign that the plaintiff’s attorney had printed from the defendant’s 
website, www.losjarritos.com.115  Plaintiff’s counsel explained that he 
personally typed the web address into his Internet browser, accessed the 
defendant’s website, and printed the picture.116  According to the court, 
counsel’s explanation of these steps demonstrated his “personal knowledge of 
the exhibit,” and thus sufficiently authenticated the evidence.117  In Jarritos, 
the “one-way” nature of the defendant’s restaurant website118 contributed to  
                     
 107. Goode, supra note 4, at 11 (citing Gregory P. Joseph, Internet and Email Evidence, 
PRAC. LITIGATOR, Mar. 2002, at 45, 46, reprinted in 5 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., FEDERAL 
RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 4–21 (9th ed. 2006)). This is essentially a variation of the 
authentication issues that arise from instant messages or e-mail.  See supra Part I.B.1–2. 
 108. St. Clair v. Johnny’s Oyster & Shrimp, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 2d 773, 775 (S.D. Tex. 1999) 
(“[T]he Court holds no illusions that hackers can adulterate the content on any web-site from any 
location at any time.”); see also Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 555 (D. Md. 
2007) (“The issues that have concerned courts include the possibility that third persons other than 
the sponsor of the website were responsible for the content of the posting . . . .”). 
 109. Goode, supra note 4, at 11 (“What was actually on the website?”). 
 110. See Jarritos, Inc., 2007 WL 1302506, at *10–11 (using the “sufficient to support a 
finding” standard to overrule defense counsel’s objection that information on a one-way website 
was properly authenticated). 
 111. FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(1). 
 112. Goode, supra note 4, at 13 (comparing courts that require the website’s owner to 
authenticate with courts allowing third-party authentication). 
 113. Id. at 13–14. 
 114. 2007 WL 1302506, at *10 (finding third-party knowledge of the website’s contents as 
adequate to authenticate the picture). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. (emphasis added). 
 118. Many websites are interactive, allowing, for example, customers to make reservations 
online. See e.g. RISTORANTE PICCOLO, http://www.piccolodc.com/about.php (scroll to bottom of 
page; then enter data in fields labeled “Party Size”, “Date”, and “Time”; then follow “Find A 
Table” hyperlink).  Some restaurants, including the former Los Jarritos restaurant (currently 
operating as “San Jalisco”), allow customers to place orders through the website.  See SAN 
JALISCO, www.losjarritos.com (follow “www.sanjalisco.com” hyperlink).  However, this type of 
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this relatively simplistic authentication method.119 
C.  A New Frontier for the Authentication of Electronic Evidence: Social 
Networking Websites 
1.  Technological and Functional Similarities Between Social Networking 
Websites and Other Forms of Electronic Evidence 
The term “social networking website” is difficult to define because of the 
complexity and variety of these types of websites.120  Nevertheless, one article 
provides a comprehensive and useful definition of social networking sites and 
defines them as “web-based services that allow individuals to (1) construct a 
public or semi-public profile within a bounded system; (2) articulate a list of 
other users with whom they share a connection; and (3) view and traverse their 
list of connections and those made by others within the system.”121  Both 
MySpace and Facebook122 contain technical capabilities that are identical or 
nearly identical in functionality to e-mail, instant messages, and one-way 
websites.123  Like e-mail, Facebook allows its users to send messages to 
                                                
interaction differs significantly from the interactive capabilities available through social 
networking websites.  See infra Part I.C.1. 
 119. See supra note 118.  The fact that the website printout of the defendant’s restaurant sign 
was evidence of the plaintiff’s trademark infringement claim also contributed to this 
straightforward authentication procedure.  See Jarritos, Inc., 2007 WL 1302506, at *10.  It is 
unclear whether the court’s holding would have been different if the plaintiff would have 
attempted to prove that a specific individual posted the photograph on the website.  See supra 
notes 66–67. 
 120. Payne, supra note 2, at 846 (“A completed profile contains approximately forty different 
ways to express information.”); Mary White, What Types of Social Networks Exist, 
LOVETOKNOW SOCIAL NETWORKING, http://socialnetworking.lovetoknow.com/What_Types 
_of_Social_Networks_Exist (last visited Sept. 28, 2012) (“Given the constant evolution of the 
online world, it would be difficult to place a limit on how many types of social networks exist.”). 
 121. Danah M. Boyd & Nicole B. Ellison, Social Network Sites: Definition, History, and 
Scholarship, 13 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. (2007), available at 
http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol13/issue1/boyd.ellison.html.  Another author has defined social 
networking sites as “interactive web sites that connect users based on common interests and that 
allow subscribers to personalize individual web sites.”  Wilson, supra note 11, at 1204. 
 122. This Comment focuses on the two popular social networking websites, Facebook and 
MySpace, for the sake of simplicity and legal relevance.  See White, supra note 120 (explaining 
that the leading websites do not represent the full scope of existing social networking websites); 
see also Minotti, supra note 14, at 1059 (citations omitted) (“MySpace and Facebook have 
proven especially useful to attorneys who seek incriminating evidence in family law matters, 
personal injury claims, and criminal law cases.”). 
 123. Minotti, supra note 14, at 1063–64 (comparing the messaging features of social 
networking websites with e-mails and noting the similarities between their inboxes and  
third-party facilitation of the communication despite both being password protected). 
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another user’s Facebook inbox.124  Facebook also has a chat function, which 
enables users to have instant message conversations with other users.125  
Finally, Facebook enables users to post information that is available either to 
the general public or to a selected group of other Facebook users.126  This 
function makes posted information available to a large audience, similar to a 
“one-way street” website.127  However, unlike one-way websites, Facebook 
allows individuals other than the user to post information on the user’s 
Facebook webpage.128  Although the user retains control over his Facebook 
webpage’s operation, other users have an abundance of options in terms of the 
type, form, and amount of information they can post on the webpage.129  Like 
Facebook, MySpace also allows users to send e-mail-like messages through 
“MySpace Mail,” have instant message conversations through “MySpace IM,” 
and upload unrestricted amounts of profile information for consumption by the 
general public or a restricted group.130 
2.  Social Networking Evidence in Case Law 
Despite the growing importance of Facebook and MySpace to the legal 
community, few courts have discussed authentication of social networking 
evidence.131  With the exception of Griffin v. State, courts discussing this issue 
                     
 124. See generally Sending a Message, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help 
?page=938 (last visited Sept. 29, 2012) (“When you send someone a message, it gets delivered to 
the person’s Facebook Messages.”). 
 125. See generally Basics: How to Chat, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help 
?page=824 (last visited Sept. 29, 2012) (explaining how a user can use Facebook chat). 
 126. When I Share Something, How Do I Choose Who Can See It?, FACEBOOK, 
http://www.facebook.com/help/?faq=120939471321735 (last visited Sept. 29, 2012) (noting that 
users have the option of sharing information with the pubic, friends, friends of anyone in the 
“tagged” picture, or only with themselves). 
 127. Id. 
 128. See Payne, supra note 2, at 845 (“[I]nformation flows not only from website owner to 
website viewer, but also from viewer to owner and viewer to viewer.”). 
 129. Id. at 845.  Payne observes: 
Facebook members can share text with multiple people through a “status update” or 
through information placed on the user’s profile.  A completed profile contains 
approximately forty different ways to express information.  Users can also share text 
with another user individually through a direct message to the user or a wall post to the 
user’s profile, or users can have a direct conversation with another user through 
Facebook’s chat feature . . . A user’s “news feed” displays all the information that his 
or her friends create, change, or share. 
Id. (citations omitted).  The ability to share pictures and videos can have particularly far reaching 
legal consequences.  See Minotti, supra note 14, at 1059 (highlighting a case where a defendant 
was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment for lack of remorse based on the defendant’s Facebook 
page that showed him wearing a shirt displaying the words “Jail Bird” on Halloween). 
 130. See generally MYSPACE, http://www.myspace.com (last visited Sept. 29, 2012). 
 131. Minotti, supra note 14, at 1070 (noting that there is very little state or federal case law 
on using social networking websites as evidence). 
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provide minimal practical guidance or legal rationale for their holdings.132  For 
example, in In re T.T., a Texas court held that there was sufficient evidence to 
support a trial court’s ruling that termination of parental rights was in the best 
interests of the children.133  The court based its ruling, in part, on incriminating 
content on the father, Johnny’s, MySpace page, which indicated that he was 
single and did not want children.134  Although Johnny took ownership of the 
MySpace page, he argued that he had no knowledge of the incriminating 
statements, claiming that a third party created the MySpace page for him.135  
When called to testify, the third party testified that he had not set up the 
MySpace page for Johnny.136  Further, Johnny’s wife testified that Johnny had 
been unfaithful to her.137  The court held that the testimony of these witnesses 
was “sufficient evidence for the jury reasonably to conclude” that Johnny had 
set up the page and authored the damaging statements.138  Despite using 
language parallel to Rule 901, the court did not explicitly address Rule 901, 
presumably because Johnny had not raised the issue of the authenticity of his 
MySpace page.139  Thus, although the court in In re T.T. “allow[ed] 
information from a MySpace page”140 as evidence, it is hardly illustrative. 
State v. Bell, an Ohio court decision, provides more guidance on 
authenticating social networking evidence.141  Similar to Shea, the defendant in 
Bell was charged with a number of sex crimes involving children.142  In 
support of its case, the State sought to introduce evidence of MySpace instant 
message conversations between the defendant and his victims.143  These 
conversations contained code phrases, such as “The Donkey Game,” which 
referred to sexual acts known only to the defendant and his victims.144  The 
defendant argued that the transcripts should not be admitted into evidence for 
lack of authenticity because (1) the transcripts could have been edited after 
                     
 132. See Griffin v. State, 995 A.2d 791, 804 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010), rev’d, 19 A.3d 415 
(Md. 2011) (noting that the court’s research revealed “only a handful of reported cases involving 
evidence specifically pertaining to social networking Web sites”). 
 133. 228 S.W.3d 312, 322 (Tex. App. 2007). 
 134. Id.  
 135. Id. at 322 (citing the defendant’s claim that he e-mailed a photograph of himself to a 
friend who subsequently created a page for him). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 322–33. 
 139. Id. at 322. 
 140. Minotti, supra note 14, at 1054 n.10. 
 141. No. CA2008-05-044, 2009 WL 1395857, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. May 18, 2009) 
(concluding that the MySpace page could be authenticated under Rule 901(b) by testimony from 
a witness with knowledge of ownership). 
 142. Id. 
 143. State v. Bell, 882 N.E.2d 502, 511 (Ct. Com. Pl. Ohio 2008), aff’d, 2009 WL 1395857, 
at *1. 
 144. Id. at 511–12. 
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they were taken from his computer; and (2) someone else could have used his 
MySpace account.145  Citing to the “low standard” of Rule 901, the court held 
that the victim could authenticate the MySpace printouts through testimony 
regarding his knowledge of the defendant’s MySpace screen name and the 
sexual code phrases.146  In the court’s view, “this would permit a reasonable 
juror to conclude that the offered printouts [were] . . .  authentic.”147 
The Bell court has been described as “especially progressive” in its treatment 
of social networking evidence.148  A New York appellate court in People v. 
Clevenstine did not take such a “progressive” approach in its application of 
Rule 901.149  In this case, the government charged the defendant with criminal 
sexual acts with underage persons.150  Similar to Bell, the prosecution’s 
evidence consisted mainly of sexually explicit MySpace conversations 
between the victims and the defendant.151  In this case, instead of printouts, the 
conversations were recorded on a computer disk, which the defendant argued 
were not properly authenticated.152  The court rejected this argument, holding 
that the evidence was authenticated through the victims’ testimony that they 
had participated in the MySpace chats with the defendant.153  In addition to the 
victims, the government called a State Police computer expert and a MySpace 
legal compliance officer as witnesses to authenticate the evidence.154  Both 
witnesses confirmed that the conversations in question had been recovered 
from the victims’ hard drives and had taken place between the MySpace 
accounts created by the defendant and the victims.155  Although the court did 
not explicitly address Rule 901, it observed that the defendant’s argument 
“presented a factual issue for the jury.”156 
                     
 145. Id. at 512. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Minotti, supra note 14, at 1071–72 (noting the decision in Bell to allow authentication 
of the MySpace chat was in accordance with the progressive approach that Ohio courts had 
generally taken). 
 149. 891 N.Y.S.2d 511, 514 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) (finding that MySpace instant messages 
were authenticated properly). 
 150. Clevenstine, 891 N.Y.S.2d at 513. 
 151. Id. at 514. 
 152. Id. at 513–14. 
 153. Id. at 514.  In support of its decision, the court also referenced the testimony of the 
defendant’s wife, who stated that she discovered the sexually explicit conversations between her 
husband and the victims on the couple’s home computer.  Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
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D.  Into the Abyss: Griffin v. State Confronts MySpace Profile Evidence 
1.  Scarcity of Social Networking Case Law Creates an Issue of First 
Impression for the Griffin Court 
Given the small number of cases discussing the authentication of social 
networking evidence, Griffin v. State presented the Maryland Court of Appeals 
with an issue of first-impression:157 whether the government properly 
authenticated printed pages from a MySpace profile under Maryland Rule  
5-901?158  In Griffin, the State of Maryland charged the defendant, Antoine 
Griffin, with murder.159  A key eyewitness for the State, Dennis Gibbs, 
provided inconsistent testimony about what he witnessed on the night of the 
murder.160  Gibbs attributed his conflicting testimony to being threatened by 
the defendant’s girlfriend, Jessica Barber, before the first trial.161  To 
corroborate Gibbs’s testimony about being threatened, the government sought 
to introduce a printout of a MySpace profile page, allegedly owned and 
authored by Barber, that contained the following statement: “FREE 
BOOZY!!!! JUST REMEMBER SNITCHES GET STITCHES!! U KNOW 
WHO YOU ARE!!”162  The profile indicated that the owner and creator of the 
page was a female from Port Deposit, Maryland, born on October 2, 1983.163  
The trial court admitted the evidence over defense counsel’s objection, and 
                     
 157. 995 A.2d 791, 804 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010), rev’d, 19 A.3d 415 (Md. 2011) (noting 
that the court’s research revealed “only a handful of reported cases involving evidence 
specifically pertaining to social networking Web sites”).  The few cases that have addressed 
authentication of social networking evidence have focused on instant messages and e-mail 
conversation conducted through MySpace.  See State v. Bell, No. CA2008-05-044, 2009 WL 
1395857 at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. May 18, 2009); Clevenstine, 891 N.Y.S.2d at 514.  These cases 
were little help to the Griffin court because the government sought to introduce evidence from a 
MySpace profile page.  Griffin v. State, 19 A.3d 415, 417 (Md. 2011).  As the Court of Special 
Appeals observed, “profile information posted on social networking Web pages differs from chat 
logs of instant message correspondence conducted through such sites.”  Griffin, 995 A.2d at 805. 
 158. Griffin, 19 A.3d at 416–17 (citation omitted) (presenting the issue as “determining the 
appropriate way to authenticate, for evidential purposes, electronically stored information printed 
from a social networking website, in particular, MySpace”).  The court later narrowed the inquiry: 
“Did the trial court err in admitting a page printed from a MySpace profile alleged to be that of 
Petitioner’s girlfriend?”  Id. at 417. 
 159. See Griffin, 995 A.2d at 794. 
 160. Id. at 794–95.  The inconsistent testimony pertained to whether Gibbs saw Griffin 
follow the victim into the bathroom with a gun.  Id.  At the first trial, Gibbs stated that he had not 
witnessed this.  Id. at 794.  During the second trial, which resulted because of a mistrial, Gibbs 
testified that he had seen Griffin and the victim enter the bathroom just before he heard the sound 
of gunfire.  Id. at 794–95. 
 161. Id. at 795 (stating that he was told that he “might catch a bullet” if he appeared in court). 
 162. Id. at 796. 
 163. Id.  The printout of the MySpace profile also had a photograph of an embracing couple 
that looked like Griffin and Barber.  Id.  The government supported the printout’s authenticity by 
introducing the testimony of the Maryland State Police investigator who originally printed the 
MySpace page from the internet.  Id. at 796–97. 
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Griffin was ultimately convicted on all counts.164  Griffin appealed to the 
Maryland Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed the judgment of the trial 
court.165  Griffin appealed again to the Maryland Court of Appeals.166 
2.  The Griffin Majority: Concerns About the Potential for Technological 
Manipulation and Impersonation 
The Maryland Court of Appeals reversed the decision and held that the 
government did not meet the authenticity threshold to admit the MySpace 
page.167  In reaching its conclusion, the court described its concern with 
information taken from MySpace: “[A]nyone can create a fictitious account 
and masquerade under another person’s name or can gain access to another’s 
account by obtaining the user’s username and password.”168  After providing 
several examples of these “fictitious account[s],” the court addressed the 
general authentication provision of Maryland Rule 5-901(a), as well as the 
illustrations relevant to the facts of this case, Rule 5-901(b)(1), and  
Rule 5-901(b)(4).169 
However, the court  quickly returned to the “fictitious account” theme, and 
ultimately held that the lower court “failed to acknowledge the possibility or 
likelihood that another user could have created the profile in issue or authored 
the ‘snitches get stitches’ posting.”170  The court found that Barber’s picture, 
date of birth, location, and reference to the defendant’s nickname on the 
MySpace page were insufficient to alleviate the court’s concerns.171  The court 
narrowed its decision by noting that its holding did not altogether preclude 
admission of evidence from social networking sites and that authentication 
methods for such evidence would gradually evolve over time.172 
                     
 164. Id.  
 165. Id. 
 166. Griffin v. State, 19 A.3d 415 (Md. 2011). 
 167. Id. at 418. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 422 (citing the knowledgeable witness and circumstantial evidence illustrations). 
 170. Id.  The court presumes that this type of evidence was authored by a  
third-party.  As such, the Griffin court transforms the burden of establishing authenticity into a 
rebuttable presumption that someone other than the purported owner of an online profile page 
created the page or authored its content.  Id.  Other courts have rejected this approach.  See In re 
F.P., 878 A.2d 91, 95 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (finding that the rules of authentication for electronic 
communication should not differ from their application to written documents). 
Moreover, the majority’s contention that the lower court did not address the possibility that 
someone other than Barber created the MySpace post is misplaced.  Griffin, 995 A.2d at 805  
(noting that “[a] proponent should anticipate the concern that someone other than the alleged 
author may have accessed the account and posted the message in question.”), rev’d, 19 A.3d 415. 
 171. Griffin, 19 A.3d at 424. 
 172. Id. at 427.  The court lists three rigid ways to authenticate social networking evidence: 
(1) ask the purported creator if she created the cite or the content; (2) “examine the computer’s 
internet history and hard drive to determine whether that computer was used to originate the 
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3. The Griffin Dissent: The Majority’s “Technological Heebie Jeebie’s”173 
and the “Reasonable Juror” Standard 
In contrast with the majority opinion, the dissent began its analysis with a 
discussion of Maryland Rule 5-901.174  Noting the overwhelming similarities 
between Maryland Rule 901 and Federal Rule 901, the dissent observed that 
every federal circuit court has adopted the standard “that a document is 
properly authenticated if a reasonable juror could find in favor of 
authenticity.”175  Addressing the majority’s concern that an imposter could 
have created an account in Barber’s name or posted the “snitches get stitches” 
threat, the dissent opined that these concerns go to the weight of the evidence 
with the trier of fact, not to its admissibility.176 
II.  THE GRIFFIN MAJORITY ADOPTS AN UNNECESSARILY STRINGENT 
AUTHENTICATION STANDARD FOR SOCIAL NETWORKING EVIDENCE 
A.  The Rehabilitation of “Voodoo Information”: The Griffin Majority’s 
Flawed Rationale 
The Griffin majority’s uneasiness with  the MySpace page is problematic177 
because the three alternative authentication measures the majority proposes do 
not adequately address its concerns of fraud.178  The first suggested method, 
asking Barber whether she created the page or posted the threat, ignores the 
fact that Barber has a motive to lie.179  The second suggested method, 
                                                
social networking profile and posting in question”; and (3) obtain information from the social 
networking site.  Id. 
 173. Id. at 430 (Harrell, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the majority’s approach underscores 
their “technological heebie jeebies”). 
 174. Id. at 428. 
 175. Id. at 429 (noting that federal and Maryland’s rules of evidence are in accordance with 
the reasonable juror standard). 
 176. Id. at 430. 
 177. See In re F.P., 878 A.2d 91, 95–96 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (rejecting the argument that 
because an imposter could send an electronic communication in someone else’s name, the court 
should construct new authentication rules).  But see Rebecca Greenfield, Facebook Has A New 
Feature That Can Help Liars, THE ATLANTIC WIRE (Nov. 15, 2011),  http://www.theatlanticwire 
.com/technology/2011/11/facebook-has-new-feature-can-help-liars/45011/ (“A new ‘edit date’ 
icon has appeared [on Facebook], hidden behind a pencil icon link at the top corner of timeline 
wall postings, allowing users to change someone’s wall post from the date it was actually posted 
to a previous moment in history.”).  Although this function does not pertain to the majority’s 
concern that an imposter could have posted the threat, it does relate to the broader fraudulence 
concerns of social networking evidence in general.  See Griffin, 19 A.3d at 428 (noting that the 
majority’s concern centered on the ability of an imposter to send an electronic communication in 
someone else’s name). 
 178. See infra notes 179–80 and accompanying text. 
 179. Although Barber’s admission that she created the MySpace page and authored the 
“snitches get stitches” comment would have provided direct evidence of authenticity, Rule 901 
and cases interpreting Rule 901 have held that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to 
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searching Barber’s computer, fails to account for the possibility that a third 
party could have used Barber’s computer.180  The third suggested approach, 
obtaining information from the social networking site that links the profile with 
its owner, overlooks the relative ease with which fraudulent accounts can be 
created.181  Because anyone can create an e-mail account to fabricate a 
MySpace account, it is not clear why a MySpace legal compliance officer’s 
testimony that a particular account was created with a particular e-mail 
establishes authenticity.182  To be fair, each of these suggested methods does 
address, albeit narrowly, the specific fraudulence concerns raised by the 
majority by making it somewhat less likely that a third party posted the 
material in question.  However, as illustrated, these methods raise an entirely 
separate set of impersonation issues.183  The slight increase–if any–in 
reliability resulting from the utilization of the majority’s proposal would also 
be grossly outweighed by the high costs and undue burden imposed through 
implementation.184 
B.  Off the Mark: The Griffin Majority’s Disconnect with Prior Case Law 
1.  Cherry-picking Lorraine: Griffin’s Selective Use of a Seminal Case 
Admittedly, the Lorraine opinion, which is often cited for its legal 
justification for the reasonable juror standard, does appear in the majority’s 
                                                
authenticate.  See FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(4); In Re F.P., 878 A.2d at 94 (“A document may be 
authenticated by direct proof and/or by circumstantial evidence.”).  Case law supports the 
conclusion that the Griffin trial court adopted the correct approach by admitting the evidence, thus 
affording the defense the opportunity to call its reliability into question in front of the jury.  
Griffin, 19 A.3d at 430 (Harrell, J., dissenting) (citing Hays v. State, 40 Md. 633, 648 (1874) 
(noting that the majority’s concern about whether Barber actually authored the statement goes to 
its weight, not its admissibility)). 
 180. See Griffin, 19 A.3d. at 423 (majority opinion) (arguing that the court of appeals gave 
too little concern to the notion that a third party may have pretended to be Barber and posted on 
the social networking website). 
 181. Id. at 420.  Ironically, the majority seems expressly aware of this fact.  Id. (noting that 
anyone fourteen or older who has an e-mail address can create a MySpace profile at no cost). 
 182. Courts have also expressly rejected the court’s third suggestion.  See In re F.P., 878 
A.2d at 93 (disagreeing with the defendant’s contention that instant message printouts could only 
be authenticated “by introducing evidence of their source from the Internet service provider or 
presenting the testimony of a computer forensics expert”). 
 183. See supra notes 179–81 and accompanying text. 
 184. See Goode, supra note 4, at 7–8 (rejecting a heightened authentication standard as 
“counterproductive” and noting that “[a]part from the difficulty of defining what types of 
evidence the new rules would apply to, the costs of imposing a new rule would greatly outweigh 
its benefits”).  Goode also argues that “[r]equiring lawyers to adduce additional proof before 
introducing any piece of electronic evidence, even in the absence of concerns about tampering or 
manipulation, will result in additional litigation costs and, where lawyers fail to jump through all 
the new hoops, the loss of reliable evidence.”  Id. 
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opinion.185  For example, the Griffin majority correctly cites the Lorraine 
court’s observation that judges are increasingly requiring litigators to increase 
focus on the “foundational requirements” when authenticating electronic 
evidence.186  However, the Lorraine court also noted that Rule 901 imposes 
only a prima facie showing, which is “not a particularly high barrier to 
overcome.”187  Nowhere in its opinion does the Griffin majority address or 
distinguish itself from Lorraine’s low barrier interpretation of Rule 901.188 
Further, the Griffin majority misconstrues the Lorraine opinion as 
supporting its position, noting that Lorraine “recognized that authenticating 
electronically stored information presents a myriad of concerns because 
‘technology changes so rapidly’ and is ‘often new to many judges.’”189  
Although Lorraine mentions that “technology changes so rapidly” and is 
                     
 185. Griffin, 19 A.3d. at 423 (citing Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534,  
543–44 (D. Md. 2007)). 
 186. Id. (citing Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 543–44). 
 187. Lorraine, 241 F.R.D.  at 542. 
 188. Griffin, 19 A.3d at 416–28.  Moreover, the majority casually dismisses the reasonable 
juror standard in a footnote when it states, “the ‘reasonable juror’ standard to which the dissent 
refers is apparently derived from the federal analogue to Maryland Rule 5–104(b), concerning 
‘relevance conditioned on fact,’ a protocol not addressed in this case.”  Id. at 424 n.12.  By noting 
the distinction between Maryland Rule 5-104(b) and its “federal analogue,” the majority suggests 
that the reasonable juror standard derives only from the latter, and not the former.  Id.  This 
approach is odd in light of the similarity between the two.  Compare MD. R. EVID. 5-104(b) 
(“RELEVANCE CONDITIONED ON FACT.  When the relevance of evidence depends upon the 
fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of 
evidence sufficient to support a finding by the trier of fact that the condition has been fulfilled.”), 
with FED. R. EVID. 104(b) (“RELEVANCE THAT DEPENDS ON A FACT.  When the relevance of 
evidence depends on whether a fact exists, proof must be introduced sufficient to support a 
finding that the fact does exist. The court may admit the proposed evidence on the condition that 
the proof be introduced later.”).  This language severely undercuts the majority’s contention that 
the reasonable juror standard “is apparently derived from the federal analogue to Maryland Rule 
5-104.”  Griffin, 19 A.3d at 424 n.12.  To the contrary, the reasonable juror standard is 
“apparently” (if not explicitly) derived from the phrase “by the trier of fact,” which is contained 
in the Maryland Rule.  MD. R. EVID. 5-104(b).  Additionally, the majority’s attempt to distinguish 
between Maryland Rule 5-104 and its “federal analogue” makes no sense in light of the advisory 
committee’s note to Maryland Rule 5-104 that states, “[t]his Rule is derived from F.R.E. 104.”  
MD. R. EVID. 5-104 advisory committee’s note.  Maryland case law also undermines the 
majority’s refusal to interpret Maryland Rule 5-104 in accordance with its federal equivalent.  
Griffin, 19 A.3d at 429 (Harrell, J., dissenting) (“Maryland courts have traditionally relied on the 
federal courts’ interpretations of analogous rules as persuasive authority. . . .” (quoting Higgins v. 
Barnes, 530 A.2d 724, 729 (1987))). 
The majority’s assertion that the court had “not been asked in this case to address the efficacy of 
the Rule 5-104(b) protocol” is similarly misplaced.  Id. at 428 n.15 (majority opinion).  The 
majority correctly recognizes that the central issue in the case is authentication.  Id. at 422.  As 
Judge Grimm observes, “authentication is essentially a question of conditional relevancy. . . .”  
Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 539 (quoting United States v. Branch, 970 F.2d 1368, 1370 (4th Cir. 
1992)).  It is therefore not clear how the Griffin court thought it could properly resolve the 
authentication issue without “address[ing] the efficacy of the 5-104(b) protocol.” 
 189. Griffin, 19 A.3d at 423 (quoting Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 544). 
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“often new to many judges,” the court does not state that these observations 
should give rise to a “myriad of concerns.”190  The “myriad of concerns” 
language is purely a creation of the Griffin court.191  Thus, the majority’s 
approach conflates the Lorraine opinion it purports to apply, and instead 
invokes a questionable analysis akin to Judge Kent’s “voodoo information.”192 
2.  Missing the Obvious: Rule 901 is Appropriate 
A majority of courts and commentators agree that the current authentication 
standard under Rule 901 is adequate for authenticating electronic evidence.193  
In particular, appellate courts consistently recognize that Rule 901’s standard is 
appropriate for addressing the issue of electronic evidence authentication.194  
These appellate court opinions usually reference either the 901(b) illustrations, 
the minimal requirements of the reasonable juror standard, or both.195  The 
Griffin majority’s analysis is inconsistent with these appellate decisions that 
                     
 190. Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 544.  Rather, the Lorraine court does not support a “one size fits 
all” approach for authenticating electronic evidence.  Id. 
 191. See Griffin, 19 A.3d. at 430 (Harrell, J., dissenting) (characterizing this attitude as the 
“technological heebie jeebies”); supra note 173. 
 192. See supra notes 1–4 and accompanying text; Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 584 (describing St. 
Clair as treating online evidence with a “extreme” skepticism); see also Wilson, supra note 39, at 
31 (describing the St. Clair opinion as “infamous.”).  The Griffin majority’s rationale for its 
reluctance to accept a MySpace profile as evidence has undertones of late 19th and early 20th 
century cases that rejected evidence in the form of photographs, motion pictures, and 
computerized records.  Compare Griffin, 19 A.3d at 421 (discussing its concerns with 
authenticating social networking website evidence), with State v. Simon, 174 A. 867, 872 (N.J. 
Sup. Ct. 1934) (indicating the court’s lack of knowledge of any cases in which a a phonograph 
record of an alleged conversation was authenticated), aff’d, 178 A. 728 (N.J. 1935), and 
Cunningham v. Fair Haven & W. R. Co., 43 A. 1047, 1049 (Conn. 1899) (excluding photographic 
evidence, the court noted that “either through want of skill on the part of the artist, or inadequate 
instruments or materials, or through intentional and skillful manipulation, a photograph may be 
not only inaccurate, but dangerously misleading.”), and United States v. Scholle, 553 F.2d 1109, 
1125 (8th Cir. 1977) (reluctantly upholding the trial court’s admission of computer generated 
business records but arguing for a more comprehensive review of their authenticity). 
 193. Grimm, supra note 20, at 362. (arguing that the existing evidence rules apply to 
electronic evidence authentication); see also In re F.P., 878 A.2d 91, 95 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) 
(holding that “electronic [evidence] can be properly authenticated within the existing framework 
of [the rules of evidence]”); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 11.446 (4th ed. 2007) 
(observing that “the Federal Rules of Evidence apply to computerized data as they do to other 
types of evidence”).  Even courts that have expressed these concerns concede that the traditional 
standards of authentication should apply to electronic evidence.  See In re Vee Vinhnee, 336 B.R. 
437, 445 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005) (noting that although “[t]he paperless electronic record 
 . . . presents more complicated variations on the authentication problem, . . . [u]ltimately, . . . it 
all boils down to the same question of assurance that the record is what it purports to be”) 
(emphasis added). 
 194. See supra Parts I.B.1–3 (discussing how different forms of electronic evidence have 
been authenticated through Rule 901). 
 195. See supra Parts I.B.1–3 (discussing ubiquitous use of the reasonable juror standard). 
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consistently  reference the “slight,”196 “minimal,”197 and “relatively low”198 
Rule 901 standard.199 
For example, in Shea v. State, the court devoted a significant portion of its 
discussion to an analysis of the facts of the case under the 901(b)(1) and 
901(b)(4) illustrations.200  Although the importance of the court’s 901(b)(4) 
discussion should not be understated, it is significant that the court 
authenticated the e-mails before it analyzed the 901(b)(4) evidence.201  This 
suggests that the court would have authenticated the e-mails based only on the 
victim’s testimony pursuant to Rule 901(b)(1).202  In other words, the 901(b)(4) 
“distinctive characteristics” identifying Shea as the author of the e-mails were 
helpful for authentication, but not required.203  That the court likely would 
have authenticated the e-mails based only on the Rule 901(b)(1) testimony 
reinforces the argument that Rule 901 imposes only a minimal burden of proof 
for authentication.204 
Additionally, the Shea court’s employment of both Rule 901(b)(1) and 
901(b)(4)205 demonstrates the adaptability of the Rule 901(b) illustrations.206  
The court discussed the victim’s testimony, that Shea called her to confirm that 
she had received his e-mails, under the 901(b)(4) analysis.207  However, this 
testimony was also clearly relevant to the victim’s knowledge under Rule 
901(b)(1);208 the victim knew that Shea sent the e-mails because she spoke to 
him about them.209  Because this testimony could have served to authenticate 
the e-mails under either Rule 901(b)(1) or Rule 901(b)(4), Shea demonstrates 
that the Rule 901 standard is not only minimal, but also flexible in its 
                     
 196. Dickens v. State, 927 A.2d 32, 37 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007). 
 197. United States v. Gagliardi, 506 F.3d 140, 151 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. 
Tin Yat Chin, 371 F.3d 31, 38 (2d Cir. 2004)). 
 198. Grimm, supra note 20, at 367. 
 199. Griffin v. State, 19 A.3d 415, 416–28 (Md. 2011). 
 200. 167 S.W.3d 98, 104–05 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005) (regarding the facts in light of a 
knowledgeable witness and in conjunction with the circumstances). 
 201. Id. at 105. 
 202. Id. (discussing the victim’s familiarity “with Shea’s e-mail address and that she had 
received the six e-mails in question from Shea”). 
 203. Id. 
 204. See supra Part I.A (outlining Rule 901’s low standard). 
 205. Shea, 167 S.W.3d at 105. 
 206. See Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 553–54 (D. Md. 2007) (arguing 
for creativity from counsel in authenticating evidence “regardless of whether there is a particular 
example in Rule[] 901 . . . that neatly fits”). 
 207. Shea, 167 S.W.3d at 105. 
 208. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 57, § 901.03[2] (“[T]he ‘knowledge’ requirement of 
Rule 901(b)(1) is liberally construed.”). 
 209. Shea, 167 S.W.3d at 105. 
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application.210  The Griffin majority’s rigid authentication analysis conflicts 
with this reality. 
III.  THE GRIFFIN DISSENT ARTICULATES THE APPROPRIATE AUTHENTICATION 
STANDARD FOR SOCIAL NETWORKING EVIDENCE 
The Griffin dissent’s approach represents a continuous and logical 
progression of evidence law because it recognizes that the current legal 
framework for authenticating social networking evidence is adequate.211  Rule 
901 provides the language of this framework—authenticity depends on 
whether a proponent has introduced evidence that is sufficient to support a 
finding that the evidence to be authenticated is genuine.212  Courts have 
overwhelmingly interpreted this language to mean that evidence can be 
authenticated if “a reasonable juror could find in favor of authenticity.”213 
Historically, courts have applied the reasonable juror standard to different 
forms of evidence.214  Because of the tremendous growth of electronic 
communication and information storage, courts quickly adapted by applying 
this standard to electronic evidence.215  From there, the question of whether 
“the existing rules of evidence adequately deal with the admissibility of 
electronic evidence” arose.216  Although some commentators answer this 
question in the negative, the overwhelming consensus is that courts should 
continue to apply the reasonable juror standard when authenticating electronic 
evidence.217 
In re F.P., in which the court upheld Rule 901’s traditionally low standard, 
best articulates the rationale behind this consensus.218  There the court 
deliberately eschewed the notion that it should apply a heightened 
authentication standard when dealing with electronic evidence: 
Essentially, appellant would have us create a whole new body of law 
just to deal with e-mails or instant messages. The argument is that  
                     
 210. See supra notes 100–03 and accompanying text (discussing an analysis in which 
circumstantial evidence can supplement an analysis under Rule 901(b)(1)); see also WEINSTEIN 
& BERGER, supra note 57, § 901.03[1] (“Parties may use any of the methods listed in Rule 
901(b), any combination of them, or any other proof that may be available to carry their burden of 
showing that the proffered item of evidence is what they claim it to be.”). 
 211. Griffin v. State, 19 A.3d 415, 429 (Md. 2011) (Harrell, J., dissenting) (arguing that a 
reasonable juror standard under Rule 901 could be applied to the authentication of information 
taken from a social networking website). 
 212. FED. R. EVID. 901(a). 
 213. Griffin, 19 A.3d at  429 (Harrell, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 214. See supra notes 44–48 and accompanying text. 
 215. See supra Parts I.B.1–3. 
 216. Grimm, supra note 20, at 361–62 (finding that admitting and authenticating electronic 
evidence is an inevitable outcome). 
 217. See supra note 211. 
 218. 878 A.2d 91, 95–96 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (noting that electronic evidence does not 
require unique rules). 
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e-mails or text messages are inherently unreliable because of their 
relative anonymity and the fact that while an electronic message can 
be traced to a particular computer, it can rarely be connected to a 
specific author with any certainty. Unless the purported author is 
actually witnessed sending the e-mail, there is always the possibility 
it is not from whom it claims.219 
The court also observed that the danger arising from this uncertainty of 
authorship is not a novel issue; written documents have always posed the same 
problem.220  Therefore, the court saw no reason to craft an entirely new set of 
rules to govern the admissibility of evidence that was presented in a unique 
form but created no unique issues.221 
This same rationale should apply to the authentication of social networking 
websites.  Comparable to other advances in electronic media, social 
networking websites provide users with a new means through which they can 
communicate and share information.222  As a result, social networking websites 
also create new opportunities for people to masquerade online as someone 
else.223  However, does this mean that courts should “create a whole new body 
of law”224 for social networking sites?  If so, what will happen when courts are 
again confronted with the next inevitable evolution in communication 
technology?  The implementation of new authentication standards for every 
advancement in telecommunications will create tremendous burdens on courts 
and practitioners while providing only marginal benefits.225  Although social 
networking websites present evidence in a unique form, they do not present 
unique authentication issues that require a heightened authentication 
                     
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. at 95 (observing that “[a] signature can be forged; a letter can be typed on another’s 
typewriter; distinct letterhead stationary can be copied or stolen”). 
 221. Id. at 95–96. 
 222. See supra Part I.C.1. 
 223. See supra note 168 and accompanying text; see also John Robinson Thomas, Legal 
Responses to Commercial Transactions Employing Novel Communications Media, 90 MICH. L. 
REV. 1145, 1158 (1992) (“Although the propensity of telefacsimiles toward darkening, skipped 
lines or pages, and undetected alteration is worrisome, these characteristics should not 
 . . . increase the required standard of authentication beyond that of ordinary writings.”). 
 224. In re F.P., 878 A.2d at 95–96. 
 225. See supra note 184 and accompanying text. 
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standard.226  The existing authentication framework will suffice, just as it did 
when other forms of electronic evidence emerged.227 
One could easily imagine a Griffin-like scenario arising in the future.  For 
example, Party A posts on her Facebook profile page, and Party B seeks to use 
the post in court.  Under the Griffin standard, Party B would need to: (a) get A 
to admit that A owns the profile and authored the incriminating post; (b) obtain 
A’s computer; or (c) bring a Facebook legal compliance officer into court to 
testify.228  These options leave B in a position of either “jump[ing] through 
[burdensome] hoops”229 to authenticate the page or foregoing the opportunity 
to present potentially valuable evidence. 
Alternatively, under the reasonable juror standard, B would likely be able to 
authenticate the post based on the information contained in the profile page.  
Most profile pages contain information similar to Barber’s profile: a picture of 
the profile owner and personally identifying information.230  Admittedly, this 
information, by itself, does not guarantee that Party A owns the page and 
created the incriminating post.  There is a small possibility that an imposter 
                     
 226. Warren Moïse, BTW, R U Ready 4 Electronic Communications?, 19 S.C. LAW. 11, 11 
(2008) (“Law journal articles abound about ‘e-mails,’ ‘e-discovery,’ e-this and e-that, as if 
authentication of electronic communications were something new. However, we’ve been doing 
this for a century with telegraphs, telephone calls and even radio communications.  Under the 
common law, a telegraph, telephone call, radio transmission or old-fashioned letter may be 
authenticated by circumstantial evidence though the recipient of the message never saw the 
sender of the message. (Not much different from an e-mail, huh?).”). 
 227. Sheldon M. Finkelstein & Evelyn R. Storch, Admissibility of Electronically Stored 
Information: It’s Still the Same Old Story, 23 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 45, 68 (2010) 
(“Admissibility of ESI underscores the adage that everything old is new again.  We must apply 
the familiar rules to types of evidence not even contemplated when the rules were written.  Yet, 
those rules are sufficiently adaptable to those who are prepared.”); Jonathan D. Frieden & Leigh 
M. Murray, The Admissibility of Electronic Evidence Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 17 
RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 2 (2011) (“It is important to remember that there is nothing ‘magical’ about 
the admission of electronic evidence. The prevalence of electronic evidence has required no 
substantial changes to the Federal Rules of Evidence. In analyzing the admissibility of such 
evidence, it is often best to treat it as originating from the most similar, non-electronic source as 
thoughtful application of traditional evidentiary principles will nearly always lead to the correct 
result. Thus, while electronic evidence may present some unique challenges to admissibility and 
complicate matters of establishing authenticity and foundation, it does not require the proponent 
to discard his knowledge of traditional evidentiary principles or learn anything truly new.”); 
Keiko L. Sugisaka & David F. Herr, Admissibility of E-Evidence in Minnesota: New Problems or 
Evidence As Usual?, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1453, 1456 (2009) (concluding that the 
Minnesota evidence law had successfully dealt with authentication of electronic evidence for 
years); see also supra Parts I.B.1–3. 
 228. Griffin v. State, 19 A.3d 415, 418 (Md. 2011). 
 229. Goode, supra note 4, at 7–8 (stating that requiring additional proof for electronic 
evidence makes lawyers jump through hoops or risk losing reliable evidence). 
 230. Help Center, FACEBOOK http://www.facebook.com/help/?page=216501321702579 (last 
visited Oct. 3, 2012); see also Griffin, 19 A.3d at 418 (illustrating that the MySpace profile in 
question had the characteristics of a typical profile page because it contained the alleged owner’s 
age, gender, hometown, birth date, and photographs). 
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could have obtained A’s picture and personal identification information, 
created a fake Facebook account in A’s name, posted A’s stolen picture and 
identification information on the fake account, and authored the incriminating 
post on the fake account in A’s name.  However, litigants should not be 
required to go through an extraordinary and burdensome process simply to 
assuage a concern that fraud might exist.  A court faced with this scenario is 
confronting the same issue that exists with a handwritten letter, an instant 
message as in In re F.P., an e-mail as in Shea, or a one-way website as in 
Jarritos.  As the court in In re F.P. discussed, “[u]nless the purported author is 
actually witnessed sending the e-mail, there is always the possibility it is not 
from whom it claims.”231  Although social networking evidence presents a new 
form of evidence, it does not present a new problem.  Therefore, a new 
authentication standard is unnecessary. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Computer technology’s exponential rate of change232 will continue to 
present challenges to lawyers and judges alike.233  Thus far, the flexibility of 
the Federal Rules of Evidence and the analogous state rules has enabled their 
successful application to evidence in the form of e-mail, instant messages, and 
websites.  The legal community now faces a new, yet deceptively familiar, 
type of technology in social networking websites.  The meteoric rise and  
well-documented popularity of these websites leaves no doubt that computer 
users will continue to make massive quantities of information available on 
these sites. Litigators will inevitably seek to use this information against their 
opponents, and opponents will inevitably seek to minimize their damaging 
effects, with the finder of fact ultimately deciding which side is more 
convincing.  Imposing a heightened authentication standard for fear of the 
unknown needlessly disrupts this process.  Opinions, such as Griffin, that have 
imposed such a standard should be relegated to the dusty bin with landlines, tv 
anenna, and those marginalized cases in which courts have taken an overly 
cautious approach toward technological progression and the rules of 
evidence.234 
                     
 231. In re F.P., 878 A.2d 91, 95 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (emphasis added). 
 232. See supra note 105 (discussing the evolution of the Internet from “web 1.0” to “web 
2.0”).  Not only has the technology evolved, but also the number of people using the 
technology—and the amount that they use it—has dramatically increased.  See supra note 15.  
The legal relevance of the number of people using these websites cannot be understated.  See 
Minotti, supra note 14, at 1059–68 (discussing cases where evidence derived from social 
networking websites has profoundly affected the outcome of a case). 
 233. See supra Part I.D.1 (discussing the challenges faced by the Maryland Court of Special 
Appeals and the Maryland Court of Appeals in deciding Griffin). 
 234. Finkelstein & Storch, supra note 227, at 46 (“After a time, when more judges will have 
been raised on computers, the suspicion in several judicial quarters surrounding the creation and 
potential alteration of ESI may diminish, and the requirements for admissibility may be less 







































                                                
demanding.  But, for now, there remain substantial pockets of judicial skepticism which result, in 
some courts, in exacting foundational requirements you must be prepared to satisfy.”). 
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